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Introduction: Colonial Perspective in Retrospect
In historical perspective and retrospect, one crucial question regarding the 
Horn of Africa1 comes back over and over again: was Ethiopia really a colonial 
empire and was it really so different from the rest of Africa? To answer these 
questions we have to distinguish our present knowledge from that of the past. 
Baz Lecocq put it rightly in his recent monograph when he asked: “How does 
historical discourse influence the present, and how does the present influence 
historical discourse?”2 These are questions which necessarily entered any kind 
of historical research in regard to Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa in general. 
Probably anywhere else has been the historical discourse so much politicized 
and ethnicized as in Ethiopia which has a long history of nationalisms, conflicts, 
civil wars and political tensions and turmoil where ethnicity and religion usually 
play a remarkable role of mobilizing factors. Ethiopian history has been a very 
complex and complicated, multi-faceted and dynamic process which cannot be 
put into a few simplifying statements and categories. So is the historiography 
which corresponds in its width to the broad and all-encompassing nature of the 
history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.3
1 The article is part of SGS-2014-005 research grant.
2 B. LECOCQ, Decolonisation, Competing Nationalisms and Tuareg Rebellions in Northern 
Mali, Leiden 2010, p. 1.
3 D. CRUMMEY, Society, State and Nationality in the Recent Historiography of Ethiopia, in: 
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From the present point of view, Ethiopia is by many authors depicted as 
a colonial power which colonized and subjugated a wide range of minorities 
inhabiting mainly the southern, eastern and western fringes of the Ethiopian 
Highlands.4 Such simplifying notions usually narrow the studied subject on 
ethnic or racial issues while they rather neglect many other factors which are 
even more important including land, societies, social changes, classes, power 
relations, military, international dimensions and many others. States and 
societies undergo perpetual changes and progresses in a context of wide range 
of factors, both internal and external. Proper understanding of (in this case) 
African past needs to put all these aspects into the context of the time which 
we study and not to put our current images and concepts or prefabricated 
ideas of our past into it. Contrasting discourses on history of Ethiopia have 
filled recent debates among academics, political activists and general public 
but have been discussed elsewhere.5
One of the perspectives which has become popular is the colonial 
perspective which is usually promoted by various Oromo scholars in the 
diaspora while some other authors have a little reserved opinion to this. 
Recently, plenty of materials have been written on “conquest, exploitation, 
and deculturation”6 “control and dominance”,7 or “genocide”.8 Ethiopia has 
been depicted as a colonial power which conquered territories inhabited by 
many different societies that were forcefully incorporated to the Empire and 
Journal of African History, Vol. 31, No. 1, 1990, pp. 103–119.
4 See e.g. A. JALATA, Contending Nationalisms of Oromia and Ethiopia. Struggling for 
Statehood, Sovereignty, and Multinational Democracy, Binghamton 2010.
5 J. SORENSON, Imagining Ethiopia. Struggles for History and Identity in the Horn of Africa, 
New Jersey 1995, pp. 70–74.
6 M. HASSEN, Conquest, Tyranny, and Ethnocide against the Oromo, in: E. GEBISSA (ed.), 
Contested Terrain. Essays on Oromo Studies, Ethiopianist Discourse, and Politically Engaged 
Scholarship, Trenton 2009, pp. 23–65.
7 G. BENTI, A Blind without a Cane, A Nation without a City: The Oromo Struggle for Addis 
Ababa, in: E. GEBISSA (ed.), Contested Terrain. Essays on Oromo Studies, Ethiopianist 
Discourse, and Politically Engaged Scholarship, Trenton 2009, pp. 147–168.
8 T. TRUEMAN, Genocide against the Oromo People, in: S. HAMESO – M. HASSEN (eds.), 
Arrested Development in Ethiopia. Essays on Underdevelopment, Democracy and Self-
Determination, Trenton 2006, pp. 133–148.
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subjugated. One of the major disagreement concerning identity and nationalism 
in Ethiopia within academic public is the essentialist-social constructivist 
debate which has been profoundly discussed by Günther Schlee elsewhere.9 
It is not the aim of this article to discuss theoretical backgrounds of these 
disputes. On the other hand, any kind of debate concerning ethnicity and 
nationalism in Ethiopia, which seems to be very much politicized these years, 
needs to take a look back in history and analyze complex historical processes 
without recent lenses influenced by abovementioned academic disputes.
Ethiopia, Historiography and Nationalism
Ethiopia, despite being ruled by the Solomonic dynasty for many centuries 
based on the three “powers” – the Emperor, the Orthodox Church, and 
Amharic language – was not a “one-way” street or “black and white” state 
as it would seem from today’s point of view. The Shawan kingdom, which 
stood at the forefront of the socio-political dynamics of modern Ethiopian 
state in the nineteenth century, was a culturally diverse, cosmopolitan and 
prosperous territory with international trade links and local or regional blood 
connections.10 Three historical stages – Imperial, socialist, federal – through 
which Ethiopia has undergone gave rise to many different perspectives on its 
history by both Ethiopian and foreign scholars, historians, anthropologists, 
political scientists and quite recently, political activists. These new waves 
of scholarship have brought not only new perspectives on relations between 
various ethnic groups as they simply put ethnicity to the forefront of research, 
but based their assumptions and writings on subjectivity, emotions, and 
simplified statements.11 It is very striking that many of recent debates concerning 
ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia completely ignore some crucial factors of 
9 G. SCHLEE, Redrawing the Map of the Horn: The Politics of Difference, in: Africa, Vol. 73, 
No. 3, 2003, pp. 343–368.
10 J. C. McCANN, An Agricultural History of Ethiopia, 1800–1990, London 1995, p. 109.
11 A. TRIULZI, Battling with the Past. New Frameworks for Ethiopian Historiography, in W. 
JAMES – D. L. DONHAM – E. KURIMOTO et. al. (eds.), Remapping Ethiopia. Socialism 
and After, Oxford 2002, p. 280.
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socio-political development in Ethiopia such as religion, regional competition 
and balance, and cross-border as well as international and transnational issues. 
Tadesse Tamrat, for instance, wrote about the rise of religious nationalism in 
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries as a significant sign of territorial expansion 
and wars with neighboring (mostly but not only) Muslim regions.12 The rise 
of religious nationalism among Muslim populations is also challenging 
“traditional” views on Ethiopian history as strictly “ethnic-based”.13
Before getting to a deconstruction of nationalisms in Ethiopia in 
historical perspectives we should put Ethiopia in a broader context of Africa. 
Due to the absence of European colonialism in Ethiopia, this country has often 
been excluded from larger comparative studies concerning decolonization 
and thus nationalism which in Africa aroused as a necessary consequence of 
colonialism. Colonial state and later the independent nation-state have largely 
contributed to the emergence of “modern conception of ethnic identity”.14 
Unlike the rest of Africa (except of Liberia), Ethiopia has been mythicized as 
an independent Empire living in relative isolation, peace, unity and civilization. 
These myths were completely broken in 1974 and until nowadays, Ethiopia 
shows a remarkably high level of internal as well as external tensions, conflicts, 
instability.
For many recent authors, Ethiopia is a colonial state of the Amharas 
that colonized dozens of ethnic groups as Oromos or Somalis in what is now 
known as Ethiopia but before 1855 these were independent territories. Such a 
statement is partly true but needs to be examined in a broader perspective. At 
the end of the nineteenth century, Ethiopia was one of a few African states that 
had a capability to defeat a European army (comparably to the Zulu victory at 
Isandlwana over the British in 1879). Due to growing European presence in 
the Horn of Africa that included French interests in Bab-al-Mandeb, British 
12 T. TAMRAT, Church and State in Ethiopia 1270–1527, Oxford 1972, pp. 206–247.
13 One of the best accounts on Islam in Ethiopia is T. ØSTEBO, Localising Salafism: Religious 
Change among Oromo Muslims in Bale, Ethiopia, Leiden 2012.
14 E. J. KELLER, Ethiopia: Revolution, Class and the National Question, in: African Affairs, 
Vol. 80, No. 321, 1988, p. 520.
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securitization of trade routes in Yemen and British Somaliland, Mahdist 
expansion in the Sudan, and primarily the Italian colonial ambitions in Eritrea 
and Italian Somaliland, Ethiopia had the only chance to secure its territory by 
militarization and expansionism.
Why are we putting these facts into a broader comparative study? 
Because what characterizes recent Ethiopian historiography is the lack of 
complexity and comparison and abundance of ethnicizied histories and 
“historical narratives based on each group’s collective memory” which 
were mostly “constructed along nationalist lines”.15 These views usually 
lack any kind of comparative methods or broader insights that would put 
the studied problem into a context of that time. Such a situation may lead 
to creation of a parallel history based on personal emotions, assumptions 
and subjective feelings. The aim of this article is thus to contextualize the 
process of development of nationalisms in Ethiopia in a broader context 
of colonial and postcolonial Africa and to analyze it in certain stages as it 
developed through last sixty years.
Political scientists and anthropologists have published plenty of articles 
and material on nationalism, ethnic conflict and identity issues in Ethiopia but 
perhaps surprisingly there exist rather minimal examination of these issues 
in historical research, let alone comparative history. This is maybe one of 
the reasons why the study of nationalisms in Ethiopia is so much politicized 
and ethnicized. What I aim to reach in this article is to differentiate and 
contextualize four stages of nationalisms in Ethiopia. First, we have to take 
into account a simple fact that despite its oppressive nature, the Ethiopian state 
successfully kept its territorial integrity untouched and protected it against 
foreign invaders. Without this success, there would be no Ethiopia and the 
development of nationalist movements would look very different when facing 
a foreign (European) colonial power.
The very first stage of the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia was that of 
the 1896 victory at Adowa over the Italian forces. The image of Ethiopia 
15 TRIULZI, p. 280.
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as a unique African power that was able to defeat a European power had 
been created. Historically, the battle of Adowa sheltered the centuries-long 
process of “unification” of Ethiopia. The concept of Ethiopian unity, on 
the other hand, was challenged by the Italian acquisition of the colony of 
Eritrea in 1890 and had significant consequences for further development 
of Ethiopia. The Italian presence in Eritrea weakened the hegemony of 
Tigray and approved the rise of Shawa as the dominant core of Ethiopian 
expansionism.16 These two centers of power have had a long history of 
rivalry at least since the sixteenth century.17 The second phase of the rise 
of nationalism in Ethiopia is related to the Eritrean and Somali issues, the 
incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopian federation and unification of the state, 
and the issue of Ogaden which challenged the Pan-Somali ideology. The 
third phase of nationalism is related to civil unrest and protests against the 
centralized power of Imperial Ethiopia and the rise of various associations 
and Marxist ideology. The last phase is characterized by ethno-nationalist 
movement throughout Ethiopia which emerged as a response to the Derg 
military socialist regime.
In all these case which will be discussed below in a deeper comparative 
perspective we can find several historical paradoxes which are not reflected 
in contemporary literature on the history of Ethiopia. First of all, we have 
to ask where the sources of the rise of ethno-national identities that filled 
the research on Ethiopia so much in last couple of decades are? It has been 
claimed that social change tends to produce stronger communal identities,18 
and this argument can stand at the core of this article, because recently it 
seems that the role of social and cultural factors have been rather downplayed 
16 T. NEGASH, No Medicine for the Bite of a White Snake: Notes on Nationalism and 
Resistance in Eritrea, 1890–1940, Uppsala 1986, pp. 39–41.
17 M. ABIR, Ethiopia and the Red Sea. The Rise and Decline of the Solomonic Dynasty and 
Muslim-European Rivalry in the Region, London 1980, pp. 154–157.
18 H. S. LEWIS, The Development of Oromo Political Consciousness from 1958 to 1994, in: P. 
T. W. BAXTER – J. HULTIN – A. TRIULZI (eds.), Being and Becoming Oromo. Historical 
and Anthropological Enquiries, Uppsala 1996, p. 38.
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by many authors dealing with ethnicity and nationalism in Ethiopia which 
only contributes to politicization of discourse on modern and contemporary 
history of Ethiopia and the Horn of Africa.
Africa in the Era of Decolonization 
Decolonization in Africa, by its nature, was a social change leading to 
emancipation of Africans and social and cultural transformation as a 
necessary alternative to colonial rule. Pan-Africanism, which once hailed 
Ethiopia as a symbol of African purity and independence, failed to create 
a unified and homogenous continent which was rather an illusion from its 
very beginning.19 Despite this, Pan-Africanism played a remarkable role in 
the decolonization period and had a great impact on nationalist movements 
in Africa although the ideology of Pan-Africanism was in sharp contrast 
with nationalist movements in African colonies seeking for independence 
and not any kind of federation with other former colonies. That is why so 
many federal projects failed (e.g. Mali and Senegal, or Ghana and Guinea) 
because they were unable to overcome the historical, linguistic and territorial 
heritage of European colonialism.
In the era of decolonization, Africa witnessed a genuine and new-
born, in a certain sense virgin waves of nationalist movements which were 
characterized by the efforts of colonized nations to proclaim independence 
or at least to gain greater autonomy. It was the World War II that served 
as accelerator of emancipation and independence thought and ambitions. 
Nationalism in Africa after the World War II can be divided in several groups 
dependent on the political and social environment in which it was rooted. The 
main nationalist sources were Pan-Africanism, Pan-Arabism, Pan-Islamism, 
and Ethno-nationalism. These were not necessarily in opposition but could 
be compatible, at least in some cases. On the other hand, it is clear that, 
for instance, Pan-Arabism did not coincide very well with Pan-Africanism 
and both ideologies had quite divergent trajectories of political goals and 
19 M. O. EZE, The Politics of History in Contemporary Africa, New York 2010, p. 125.
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ambitions. The oldest nationalist movements of these are Pan-Africanism and 
Pan-Islamism whose first rise to political and social significance took place 
already at the beginning of the 20th century.
Despite many differences between Ethiopia and the rest of Africa 
under colonial rule, we can find some general similarities between these two 
entities in the process of the development of nationalist movements and social 
transformations. As suggested by Crawford Young, the era of decolonization 
was the “golden age” of associational life and thus the rise of civil society.20 
In the 1950s in many corners of Africa including Ethiopia we can see the rise 
of various associations including trade unions, student associations, ethno-
regional political parties (mainly in countries like Congo, Nigeria) and the 
growth of state bureaucracy as well as private business. Many perspectives have 
been “invented” in terms of evaluating the colonial and postcolonial state in 
Africa ranging from optimistic hopes dedicated to the independence of African 
states and societies in the early stage of 1960s through dependency theories in 
1970s and 80s until pessimistic approach considering a postcolonial state in 
Africa as an “alien model of a nation-state”.21
With no surprise, many of the African states ended up very soon in some 
form of authoritarian rule ranging from those who were supported by former 
colonial power to those more radical in terms of dealing with historical/
colonial heritage. Due to the lack of contact and understanding between states 
and societies we have to distinguish an official nationalism (state nationalism) 
from other types of nationalism (ethno-nationalism) which were created as the 
result of failed hopes and dreams of early generations of intellectual elites. Not 
surprisingly either, socialist and Marxist tendencies became popular among 
African (including Ethiopian) intelligentsia and students as well as trade 
unions and workers because of its alternative against European capitalism 
which was necessarily associated with colonialism.
20 C. YOUNG, The African Colonial State in Comparative Perspective, New Haven 1994, p. 
237.
21 P. NUGENT, Africa since Independence, New York 2004, p. 8.
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Pan-Arabism, together with Pan-Africanism, served as the most important 
accelerator of nationalism in North Africa shortly after the end of the World War 
II. In 1952, Egypt proclaimed independence, only a year after Libya. But Egypt’s 
case was more important because of its historical significance, and because 
Egypt has traditionally been a centre of Arab and Islamic world. Moreover, 
its geographical position connected Egypt with African, Middle Eastern, and 
Mediterranean environments. Pan-Islamism as a powerful means of social 
mobilization played a significant role since the beginning of the 20th century, 
and especially Egypt served as a centre of reformist Islamic thinking. But due to 
more or less secular character of African nationalism before and after the World 
War II, the importance of Pan-Islamism gained momentum mainly in the era of 
independence when secular states in North Africa witnessed first serious socio-
political crisis. Iranian revolution in 1979 was a heyday for most of the Islamic 
movements in North, West, and East Africa, and since that period we can see the 
rise of various movements inspired by the events in Iran. Moreover, as a reaction 
to the rise of Shi’ism, Wahhabist Saudi Arabia strengthened its efforts to export 
its ideology and to stop the influence of Iran in Africa.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, ethno-nationalism was a major challenge to Pan-
Africanism, because, unlike Pan-Africanism, ethno-nationalism was aimed to 
serve various nationalities to proclaim independent states, and thus fragment 
already existing states into smaller territories. From the very beginning of the 
formation of political parties in many of the African states, ethno-nationalism 
served as major means of social mobilization and people were instructed to 
vote for their ethnic parties and representatives. In countries like Nigeria, 
Democratic Republic of Congo, or Kenya, there was a lack of national identity 
feeling and political parties had very serious ethnic and regional attachments 
thus making it impossible to reach a national consensus. With no surprise, 
Nigeria and Congo ended up in years of conflicts which up to date have been 
uneasy to completely overcome.
Fragmentation of Nigeria and Congo, two very important states in Africa, 
was the biggest obstacle for Pan-Africanist dreams of African unity, common 
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African government, parliament, and currency. If these countries were unable 
to reach consensus, how then all more than fifty states were supposed to reach 
the goal of unity? Disunity did not reach only these ethnically diverse states 
but was a case of much smaller and relatively homogeneous countries like 
Rwanda or Burundi. From the very beginning of the decolonization process, it 
was clear that both countries could not reach any national unity.
After new independent states were created, the international community 
including the Organization of African Unity (OAU) did everything it could to 
maintain the integrity of African states. It was clear that any disintegration in 
one part of Africa could inspire other emancipation, or separatist movements 
in other parts of the continent.
Ethiopia under Imperial Rule
Modern history of Ethiopia has been in official historiography presented 
through eyes of the ruling circles mostly ignoring the fact that outside what 
was called Abyssinia there existed a number of political units with their 
own political, religious, and social systems that contributed to the diversity 
of Ethiopia in many ways. That is also why there is no agreement between 
scholars on whether we should talk about unification or re-unification, the 
process that took place in 1855 and continued until the beginning of the 20th 
century when Ethiopia gained more or less the shape we can see today.
The expansion of Ethiopian state into the Oromo speaking areas was not 
a task of subjugation and domination, as everything in history, all expansions 
and intercultural contacts bring not only disasters and conflicts, but also 
new opportunities and development. Moreover, during the era of the Princes 
(zemane mesafint), territory of what is now Ethiopia was challenged by 
Egyptian influence which even counted with the conception of the province of 
al Habasha and by perpetual wars between various Oromo, Amhara, Tigrayan 
and other principalities.22 This was, for instance, the case of Jimma town, the 
22 M. ABIR, Ethiopia: The Era of the Princes. The Challenge of Islam and the Re-Unification 
of the Christian Empire 1769–1855, London 1968, pp. 136–137.
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most important Oromo trading area in South-west Ethiopia (ca. 375km from 
Addis Ababa). In the nineteenth century the town was known for its slave trade 
as the slaves were taken mostly from the Omo river areas.23 After the Menelik 
II rise to power the town was incorporated into the Ethiopian state structures 
but remained largely intact by any significant influences coming from the 
north. Rās Gobenā, on behalf of Menelik II, signed an agreement with Abbā 
Jifār II in which Menelik agreed to respect the full internal autonomy of Jimma 
kingdom, not to station troops, and not to construct churches there. Abbā Jifār 
II recognized Menelik II as his overlord, agreed to pay annual tribute and 
assist and even accompany Menelik’s army in the military campaigns.24
Both before and during the state formation in Ethiopia, in every region one 
could see plenty of local clashes between various clans or powerful individuals 
who were able to command strong private armies. Several studies have shown 
that this was also the case of Wällagga region in Western Ethiopia, claimed to 
be one of the centers of Oromo nationalism. Unlike some recent studies which 
try to depict the Oromo unity and national identity as a historical, centuries-
long fact, Wällagga region, just like any other place in what is now Ethiopia, 
witnessed clan clashes and land disputes between powerful individuals which 
simply lacked any kind of “ethnic” dimension because ethnic identities as 
we know them today were not yet articulated.25 Another important factor 
that contributed to the ever-changing dynamic development in Ethiopia was 
migration and marriage politics which is known also from European history as 
an important tool by which powerful elites were able to extend their territories 
or secure their independence. Such was a case of both the Imperial court in 
Shawa as well as local and regional political units including Jimma, Enarea, 
23 T. WOLDEMARIAM, Slavery and the Slave Trade in the Kingdom of Jimma (ca. 1800–
1935), MA Thesis, Addis Ababa 1984, pp. 53–58.
24 T. SEMMA, Origin and Development of Jimma Town to 1942, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa 
2007, p. 12.
25 T. TA’A, The Political Economy of West Central Ethiopia: From the Mid-16th to the Early 
20th Centuries, Ph.D. Thesis, East Lansing 1986; O. TUJUBA, Oromo-Amhara Relations in 
Horro Guduru Awraja (Northwestern Wallaga), c. 1840s–1941, MA Thesis, Addis Ababa 
1994.
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Kaffa and many others.26 Moreover, as is shown on many examples from the 
nineteenth century, not only Shawa, but simply all political units (no matter 
whether we call them states, kingdoms or tribes) tended to extend their control 
over trade routes and slave routes. This was the case of Jimma, Limmu-Enarea 
(the so-called Gibe states), Shawa and plenty of smaller clan units of which, 
by supreme military power and a number of coincidences Menelik II became 
the most successful.27
Reasons of Menelik’s success are multiple and correspond to various 
structural changes including a growing market, introduction of a standing 
army, growth of infrastructure and incorporation of various subjects into the 
economy of Shawa. For instance, the long-distance trade was dominantly 
a matter of the Oromo and Afar Muslims, who were able to trade with 
neighboring Muslim territories. By prohibiting them to own the land and 
practice agriculture, Muslims turned to trade and have become the dominant 
aspect of all-Ethiopian trade.28
Hostilities which recent authors attribute to Amhara and Oromo struggle 
were common in all areas where territorial expansion took place. The same 
expansion which the Ethiopian state underwent in the second half of the 
nineteenth century was done by many of the Oromo clans in peripheral regions 
of what is now Ethiopia. At the Ethio-Sudanese borders, for instance,  the 
Oromo clan led by Jotee Tullu of Leeqa Qellem invaded the Goma territory 
and established his rule over the Goma before the rise of Menelik II.29 Another 
strategy or practice aimed at gaining social, political or religious benefits was 
the practice of mogaasa (adoption) based on assimilating alien individuals 
26 H. SEREKET-BRHAN, Building Bridges, Drying Bad Blood: Elite Marriages, Politics and 
Ethnicity in 19th and 20th Century Imperial Ethiopia, Ph.D. Thesis, East Lansing 2002.
27 T. D. FERNYHOUGH, Serfs, Slaves and Shifta. Modes of Production and Resistance in 
Pre-Revolutionary Ethiopia, Addis Ababa 2010, p. 110.
28 R. H. K. DARKWAH, Shewa, Menelik and the Ethiopian Empire 1813–1889, London 
1975, pp. 152–157.
29 T. TA’A, A Brief Historical Account of the Goma of the Ethio-Sudanese Frontier (ca. 
1880s–1950s), in: B. ZEWDE (ed.), Land, Gender and the Periphery. Themes in the History 
of Eastern and Southern Africa, Addis Ababa 2003, p. 172.
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to the Oromo nation.30 Assimilation was not only an official practice of the 
Imperial court but a natural process of expansion (both in territorial and 
political or economic senses) of the Oromo people and many other groups 
in the Horn of Africa. That power struggles were never a one-way process 
is shown by Triulzi on the example of Kumsa Moroda, who, as a ruler of 
Nekemte, achieved a relatively great autonomy and power to expand to 
Western peripheries.31
From regional and historical perspectives, there were many differences 
among various Oromo-speaking regions in Ethiopia in terms of access to 
land and administrative within state structures. While in eastern Wällagga, 
for instance, landlords and governors were dominantly Amharic speaking 
“outsiders” from Addis Ababa, in western part of the region, as well as in 
Jimma, many local Oromo leaders took part in state structures and cooperated 
with Imperial court and only a few Amhara civil servants worked there mostly 
as teachers and policemen.32 Ethnicity was not an important issue during 
the early days of the twentieth century. As a country with strong and vivid 
religiosity, Islam and Christianity played more significant role and so did 
the regional aspect dividing the population between “locals” and “outsiders” 
without direct ethnic connotations. By “outsiders” we mean landlords and 
usurpers of land which created a gap between the society and state in Ethiopia 
and contributed to the development of what is called “moral ethnicity”.33
Two aspects played an important role in “nation-building” and “state-
building” process in Ethiopia at the end of the nineteenth century. These were the 
struggle against foreign invaders and threats (Mahdists, Egyptians, European 
powers) and internal challenges that included primarily Muslims who were 
mainly for Tewodros II and Yohannes IV the archenemies. While the main aim 
30 A. HAILE, Gada System. The Politics of Tulama Oromo, Addis Ababa 2009, p. 18.
31 A. TRIULZI, Nekemte and Addis Abeba: dilemmas of provincial rule, in: D. L. DONHAM 
– W. JAMES (eds.), The Southern Marches of Imperial Ethiopia, Oxford 2002, pp. 54–55.
32 J. HULTIN, Rebounding Nationalism: State and Ethnicity in Wollega 1968–1976, in: Africa, 
Vol. 73, No. 3, 2003, p. 410.
33 Ibidem, 404.
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of the emperors was to keep the Christian identity of Ethiopia, for Muslims, 
the primary aim was the survival of their faith.34 Religious expansion during 
the heyday of the Imperial regime was accompanied by perpetual changes in 
religious settings. Not only by the rise of Orthodox Christianity which formed 
the core element of the Solomonic dynasty but also due to the response of 
local people which brought many religious alternatives. For instance, people 
of the Gamo Highlands partly accepted the Orthodox Christianity but on the 
other hand, the expansion of Northerners gave opportunity to the rise of local 
cult called Essa Woga whose central point was “the abolition of sacrifices 
and sacrificers”.35 Protestant churches played a remarkable role especially in 
Ethiopia’s Western and South-western territories. It is observable that in many 
corners of Ethiopia, like Dembi Dollo in Western Wällagga, the significance 
of foreign churches is of no doubt as it has contributed to the development of 
these areas in terms of education and health care.
Colonialism and the Emperor
Emperor Haile Selassie was usually portrayed as a modernizer of Ethiopia 
which partly is true but can be attributed only to the first years of his power 
during which the first constitution came into being (1931), or completely new 
elite of government officials and “urban plutocrats has taken place beside the 
old”.36 But the true modernization was limited by enormous centralization, 
bureaucracy, poverty, lack of infrastructure, and censorship.37 The basic 
network of towns and generally the level of urbanization was still very low at 
the beginning of Haile Selassie’s rule as the country was traditionally based 
on small villages and isolated homesteads.38 Probably the most non-modern 
34 D. ROBINSON, Muslim Societies in African History, Cambridge 2004, pp. 116–119.
35 D. FREEMAN, Initiating Change in Highland Ethiopia. Causes and Consequences of 
Cultural Tranformation, Cambridge 2002, pp. 33–34.
36 D. N. LEVINE, Wax and Gold. Tradition and Innovation in Ethiopian Culture, Chicago 
1965, p. 150.
37 R. K. MOLVAER, Black Lions. The Creative Lives of Modern Ethiopia’s Literary Giants 
and Pioneers, Lawrenceville 1997, pp. xv–xvi.
38 R. PANKHURST, Economic History of Ethiopia 1800–1935, Addis Ababa 1968, p. 689.
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aspect of Haile Selassie’s rule was the extreme centralization which affected 
many levels of administration and daily lives of ordinary Ethiopians. The 
Emperor appointed all governors down to the woreda level, except for Wollo and 
Hararghe provinces where governors were appointed by Crown Prince. Such an 
arrangement gave rise to a strong patronage system in which “each official at the 
higher rung used his influence to promote his men at the lower rung”.39
Despite the ethnic and regional aspects that come into play in regard 
to Eritrean nationalism and the struggle for self-determination, a historical 
and colonial heritage should be taken into account as well. As rightly pointed 
by Tekeste Negash, Eritrea was a result of the Italian colonialism which was 
responsible for the economic infrastructure and Mediterranean life style, 
and the British administration which gave the country “political freedom 
and democratic practices”40 unknown in Ethiopia to which Eritrea was 
incorporated.
Bulcha pointed at the discrepancy between usual persuasion of 
politicians, according to whom a language homogenization is a necessary step 
towards social and economic development, and the case of Ethiopia, which 
tells us that the opposite is true. The policy of “one language one nation” 
became an obstacle to socio-economic development, because insistence on the 
use of s single language prevented vital information from reaching the majority 
of the population. Radio Ethiopia, for instance, broadcasted all information 
regarding health, agriculture, or education only in Amharic. This means that 
the “Amharic only” education and administration hampered Oromo education 
for decades.41
Colonial perspective which is one of the perspectives we can use when 
considering the modern history of Ethiopia cannot be simplified as a colonial 
conquest of Amharas against Oromo and other Southern peoples. Moreover, 
39 D. RAHMATO, The Peasant and the State. Studies in Agrarian Change in Ethiopia 
1950s–2000s, Addis Ababa 2009, pp. 115–116.
40 T. NEGASH, Eritrea and Ethiopia. The Federal Experience, Uppsala 1997, p. 144.
41 M. BULCHA, The Politics of Linguistic Homogenization in Ethiopia and the Conflict over 
the Status of Afaan Oromo, in: African Affairs, Vol. 96, 1997, p. 336.
Jan Záhořík
Colonial Perspective and Nationalism(s) in Ethiopia in the Context of African Decolonization
164
simplifications never help any serious research and understanding of the 
problem of study. Amharic speaking people in general have never formed any 
privileged class or group inside Ethiopia. Power relations in Ethiopia were 
formed, just like in Rwanda or Burundi or some other “traditional” kingdoms 
or units in Africa on the basis of regional and social relations and status. Since 
1855, it was mainly Shawa and politicians from Shawa (who were not only 
Amharas) that dominated the political scene in Ethiopia and were responsible 
for further expansion southwards. Siegfried Pausewang, for instance, was one 
of those who claimed that there does not exist an “Amhara” identity but at 
least two different Amhara identities meaning “rural” and “urban” (ethnically 
mixed) assimilated cultural Amhara “who understand themselves as Ethiopians 
with an Amhara language”.42 Especially in the countryside among peasants, 
no matter in which part of today’s Ethiopia, people used to identify themselves 
regionally as Gondare, Gojjame, just like Oromo speaking people used to 
identify themselves along clan-lines (Borana, Guji, Arssi, Macha, etc.).43 John 
Markakis talks about provincionalism in this regard as the main feature of 
traditional Ethiopia. When it comes to Shawa he says that “this province lacks 
a distinct identity and provincial consciousness” as it is composed of “Shawa 
Amhara” and “Shawa Oromo” societies while Tigray region in the northern 
part of Ethiopia “is the most self-conscious province of Ethiopia”.44
Such a regional focus is supported by a historical course of revolution 
leading to the fall of Haile Selassie regime. Beside clearly territorial and to a 
certain sense “anti-colonial” struggle in Eritrea, other uprisings had specific 
local and regional roots which had little to do with ethnic sentiments but 
rather with socio-economic factors and situation. The Wäyane rebellion, 
Bale rebellion or the uprising in Gojjam at the end of 1960s aroused as a 
combination of various factors including religious rights, agricultural taxes 
42 S. PAUSEWANG, The Two-Faced Amhara Identity, in: Scrinium. Revue de patrologie, 
d’hagiographie critique et d’histoire ecclésiastique, Tome 1, Varia Aethiopica In Memory of 
Sevir B. Chernetsov, 2005, p. 274.
43 Ibidem, p. 277.
44 J. MARKAKIS, Ethiopia. Anatomy of a Traditional Polity, Addis Ababa 2006, pp. 66–67.
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and others.45 Beside spatial differences social ones need to be taken into 
consideration as well. Revolution was, as will be discussed later, a matter 
of urban intelligentsia, mainly students, who within the so-called zemecha 
campaign had a direct impact on revolutionary climate in the countryside, as 
shown by Donald Donham on the example of Maale in southern Ethiopia.46
Any colonial perspective thus needs to be looked upon as a historical 
process of regional power relations and has to be distinguished between various 
types of colonial perspective. The first one is obvious; the Eritrean struggle 
of independence after Eritrea was fully incorporated into the Ethiopian state 
in 1962. Somali inhabited Ogaden region can be put into the same category 
as the Somali speaking people tend to have only a minimal attachment to 
the Ethiopian state, no matter which historical period we are dealing with. 
Up to 1957, there were, for instance, no schools in the Ogaden despite many 
promises given by Haile Selassie. Outbreak of secessionist attempts in Ogaden 
gained momentum in 1963 after the imposition of the tax by the court and 
more openly in 1969 after Siad Barre’s accession to power in Somalia.47 At the 
very local level, there remained rivalry between Ogaden pastoralists and Ishaq 
clan which diversifies our understanding of the Somali nationalism.48
More important for the rise of nationalist movements was the regional 
rivalry inside Ethiopia alienating Shawa and Tigray regions.49 Gebru Tareke 
has rightly stated that there exist two historical heritages in Ethiopia and two 
45 D. CRUMMEY, Land and Society in the Christian Kingdom of Ethiopia. From the Thirteenth 
to Twentieth Century, Urbana, Chicago 2000, pp. 242–244.
46 D. DONHAM, Marxist Modern. An Ethnographic History of the Ethiopian Revolution, 
Oxford 1999, pp. 45–49.
47 Somali nationalism became an important mobilization factor for Somali speaking Issa clan 
in Djibouti. For further information see e.g. K. SHEHIM – J. SEARLING, Djibouti and the 
Question of Afar Nationalism, in: African Affairs, Vol. 79, 1980, p. 212.
48 S. NEGASH, Colonial Legacy, State Intervention and Secessionism: Paradoxical National 
Identities of the Ogaden and the Ishaq Clans in Ethiopia, in: B. ZEWDE (ed.), Society, State 
and Identity in African History, Addis Ababa 2008, pp. 283–285.
49 Similarly to this, some authors distinguish between more individualistic Amhara sub-culture 
and Tigray associated with group orientation. See e.g. T. NEGUSSIE and his article in Addis 
Standard, Vol. 2, No. 19, 2012, pp. 22–23.
Jan Záhořík
Colonial Perspective and Nationalism(s) in Ethiopia in the Context of African Decolonization
166
historical narratives. The first one is related to Axum whose direct successor 
is said to be Tigray. The second heritage is connected with the unification of 
Ethiopia and the Shawan expansion. During the twentieth century, Tigray was 
always an economic backwater in Ethiopia, similar to many other regions. In 
other words, the Tigray-Shawan rivalry had a great impact on the development 
of various movements in Ethiopia and Eritrea including the Tigray People’s 
Liberation Front (TPLF).50
Marxism as an Alternative
Marxism was a powerful, and to a certain extent a logical response to European 
colonialism as it rhetorically gave space and accent to solidarity and equality 
to the people. The period of 1950s and 1960s was the heyday of Marxist and 
generally anti-colonial and leftist ideologies for the former colonial world in 
Africa and Asia. From a political point of view, Marxist regimes have never been 
the same and their main characteristic was – especially in Africa – eclecticism 
both in ideological interpretation or policy practice.51 The rise of Marxism 
coincides with the development of nationalist movements in Africa, including 
Ethiopia, where the circumstances for the development of such movements 
and ideologies were little different. Still, we can find several similarities. 
Many of the nationalist movements in Africa began as student movements 
or were created around the workers’ and trade unions, teachers and student 
associations, etc. In many parts of Africa, the situation after the Second World 
War led to a continuous development of the Middle class, educated elites, 
allowed young generation to study in Europe and gain education outside 
the country in order to contribute to the socio-economic development of its 
homeland after their return. For France, for instance, the main idea after the 
war was to create a “Europeanized” Africa under colonial rule with a modern 
50 G. TAREKE, The Ethiopian Revolution. War in the Horn of Africa, New Haven 2009, pp. 
76–79.
51 C. YOUNG, Ideology and Development in Africa, New Haven 1982, pp. 26–27.
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African working class as a crucial element.52 Before 1941, education in Ethiopia 
was conducted in French language and many Ethiopians studied in France and 
thus it was no surprise that for many young Marxist intellectuals in Ethiopia, the 
French Revolution was the model. Marxism was by these elites viewed as an 
unchallengeable truth, representing “a principled way to reject the West that had 
supported Haile Selassie and hence Ethiopia’s backwardness”.53
Due to the cold war context and the fear of outside interference, many 
of the African governments preferred single party politics which was meant 
to keep integrity of states. What was common to almost all regimes in Africa, 
was a high level of centralization of administration which had to deal with 
many different demands of class, ethnic, and regional entities.54
Despite being out of the “colonial” Africa, Ethiopia was not an isolated 
island, and to a certain extent was influenced by global and continental changes. 
The same can be said about Ethiopia’s role in the development of nationalism 
in many African countries for which Ethiopia served as an independent symbol 
of African purity. Under the influence of external dynamics of the early 1960s, 
Ethiopia witnessed the creation of Confederation of Labor Unions in 1962 
followed by the rise of student and teachers associations. This alone was 
not the most crucial aspect leading towards the development of nationalist 
movements in Ethiopia. Two factors need to be mentioned first. Primarily, the 
preferential treatment of the military forces from the Imperial court leading to 
pay increases alienated other actors including civil servants and trade unions 
whose demands were not met with such a success. Second factor was the rise 
of external influence coming from Marxist students. It has been documented 
that in 1974 shortly before the fall of Haile Selassie, of 4,500 university 
52 T. CHAFER, The End of Empire in French West Africa. France’s Successful Decolonization?, 
Oxford 2002, pp. 119–120.
53 M. ASRAT, Modernity and Change in Ethiopia: 1941–1991. From feudalism to ethnic 
federalism (A Fifty years of Political and Historical Portrait of Ethiopia). A Participant-
Observer Perspective, Ph.D. Thesis, Troy 2003, p. 21.
54 P. MANNING, Francophone Sub-Saharan Africa 1880–1995, Cambridge 1995, pp. 152–153.
Jan Záhořík
Colonial Perspective and Nationalism(s) in Ethiopia in the Context of African Decolonization
168
graduate students in Ethiopia, 1,000 of them gained their education abroad.55 
Already in mid-1960s, the Ethiopian Student Movement came into being with 
branches in Addis Ababa, Western Europe and North America. These were 
the early days of active Marxist-Leninist student groups formulating ideology 
directed against the archaic feudal and capitalist order.
The early protests of Ethiopian students did not take place in Ethiopia that 
much but were rather a matter of several hundred students living in the United 
States of America during the 1960s who accused Haile Selassie of repression, 
torturing and any opposition voices, massacring peasants and called for the 
dismantling of the feudal regime with slogans like “Feudalism no, people’s 
democracy yes”.56 Although ethnic issues had been probably in the minds of 
some of the intellectuals of that time, no one mentioned them directly.57
The power of Marxism as a mobilizing power has been experienced in 
many corners of the Third World and the Horn of Africa was no exception. From 
a broader perspective, the revolution in Ethiopia was seen by many Marxists as 
inspirational and for Fidel Castro the success of the Ethiopian revolution later 
in 1974 was “of enormous importance for Africa”.58 As admitted by a Pan-
African activist Bereket Habte Selassie: “Its appeal consists in the promise 
that it offers to the larger mass of populations that their lives would be better 
off after they shake off the shackles of oppression of the dominant classes, be 
they feudal lords or exploiting merchant classes.”59
Ethiopia had long been seen as an island in Africa due to the lack of 
communication between the country and rest of the continent. This situation 
changed dramatically after the Second World War as Ethiopia became an active 
55 A. TIRUNEH, The Ethiopian Revolution 1974–1987. A transformation from an aristocratic 
to a totalitarian autocracy, Cambridge 1993, p. 28.
56 T. M. VESTAL, The Lion of Judah. Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia and the Shaping of 
Americans Attitudes Toward Africa, Santa Barbara 2011, pp. 162–163.
57 B. PRAEG, Ethiopia and Political Renaissance in Africa, New York 2006, p. 69.
58 S. MALLEY – F. CASTRO, Fidel Castro Interviewed on Ethiopia, in: MERIP Reports, Vol. 
62, 1977, p. 23.
59 B. HABTE SELASSIE, Wounded Nation. How a Once Promising Eritrea was Betrayed and 
in Future compromised, Trenton 2011, pp. 44–45.
wbhr 01|2014
169
member of Pan-African initiatives and Haile Selassie himself was seen as a 
noble man with a great reputation as the leader of a great African nation that 
survived the European colonialism and defeated one of the colonial powers. 
Beside Haile Selassie and other members of the government and diplomacy, it 
was the student exchange that enabled the spread of Pan-African and Marxist 
ideas into Ethiopia. At the end of 1950s with the coming of several hundred 
African students to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia was still perceived by its own citizens 
as a little different as found out by Balsvik.60 But the decolonization period 
brought several changes into Ethiopia as well. With its aspirations to become 
the headquarters of African integration process resulting in the creation of the 
Organization of African Unity, Ethiopian intellectuals and students began to 
emphasize the African part of Ethiopia’s history. Ethiopian students already 
in 1957 took part in Pan-African student conference in Kampala and although 
it is dubitable how much influence it had on the development of Pan-African 
ideology inside Ethiopia, it is clear that through these networks Ethiopian 
students became aware of foreign ideologies and foreign problems that other 
African societies had to deal with in regard to decolonization. And through 
these networks, many Ethiopian students came into contact with some radical 
Marxist theories presented for instance by Kwame Nkrumah.61 This Pan-
African leader visited Ethiopia in 1957. The year of Ghana’s independence, 
which has a significant impact on formation of anti-colonial thinking among 
the younger generation of educated intellectuals.62
The rise of Marxism in Ethiopia and the rest of Africa can be observed in 
the same trajectories. At the end of colonial rule, almost all European powers 
allowed larger numbers of students to acquire higher education and generally 
the conditions for African colonial subjects were developing and improving. 
In Ethiopia, some reforms took place especially after the abortive coup on 
60 R. R. BALSVIK, Haile Sellassie’s Students: The Intellectual and Social Background to 
Revolution, 1952–1974, Addis Ababa 2005, p. 206.
61 Ibidem, pp. 206–209.
62 ASRAT, pp. 78–79.
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1960 and during the 1960s and early seventies the number of students as well 
as teachers grew rapidly. This helped a middle class to be developed mainly 
in bigger towns while the peasants lived in the same conditions as at the 
beginning of the twentieth century.
During the Derg regime, the Imperial policy of appointing officials 
from the center to the regions and local levels continued and the scenario 
remained the same, local officials had to be loyal only upward. Such a system 
again bypassed “the indigenous structures of decision-making and identity 
formation”.63 Centralization remained in the hand of a narrow elite, this time 
the military forces which despite being supported at the beginning by student 
movements largely ignored what teachers and students thought. Already 
at the end of 1974, the military forces were looked upon as “dishonorable 
replacement of the Imperial regime”.64
Marxism influenced Ethiopia and especially its younger generation of 
students with the same intensity as it was in the rest of Africa during the time 
of decolonization. The rise of the Derg regime gave opportunity for many 
(not only) Oromo cadres to become a part of the ruling class while the regime 
itself fought against any kind of ethnic nationalism which emerged in the 
mid-1970s. Thus the Oromo society itself was polarized between supporters 
of the Derg military regime and those who stood against it and wished to 
reach a higher level of self-determination resulting in an independent Oromia 
which would give the region more stability, according to some.65 It was during 
the Derg regime, and especially at the end of its existence when the colonial 
perspective began to be accented from the Oromo part of society. While 
the military junta lost the war in 1991 after a coordinated struggle of major 
liberation fronts, the colonial perspective prevailed with the unresolved social 
63 J. ABBINK, Local Leadership and State Governance in Southern Ethiopia: From Charisma 
to Bureaucracy, in: O. VAUGHAN (ed.), Indigenous Political Structures and Governance in 
Africa, Ibadan 2003, p. 180.
64 R. R. BALSVIK, The Quest for Expression: State and the University in Ethiopia under 
three regimes, 1952–2005, Addis Ababa 2007, pp. 48–49.
65 Interview with a political activist, Addis Ababa, 9 September 2009.
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and ethnic disputes over the structure and shape of the Ethiopian state and the 
right to self-determination. On the other hand, Ethiopian state and its territory 
have been redefined by the independence of Eritrea which came into being in 
1993.
The military regime of the Derg had a great impact on social relations 
in Ethiopia. Not only it established the land reform under the slogan “land to 
the tiller”, but due to its authoritarian and centralizing character, suspicious 
of any kind of opposition, it divided families and drastically changed 
collective relations in villages at any local level. Proponents of Marxism 
were privileged while those who remained “inactive” or “silent” could be 
imprisoned with no accusation. Such examples were not unique but counted 
thousands of innocent people.66
In the 1970s during the era of the rise of the so-called ethno-nationalist 
movements, many of these groupings were inspired by Marxism-Leninism, 
although we may expect a certain amount of eclecticism in ideological and 
practical issues. Pragmatic approach to reality and ethnic/national questions 
of Ethiopian regimes can be well observable on Gerard Chaliand’s note: 
“Yesterday when the world was apparently simple and straightforward, it 
was reassuring to see the United States backing Emperor Haile Selassie in 
Ethiopia, who was in turn fighting against a liberation movement backed 
by ‘progressive’ countries. Today we have the reverse pattern: a regime in 
Ethiopia claiming to be Marxist-Leninist suppressing liberation movements in 
Eritrea and the Ogaden, and behaving imperially.”67
Eritrean nationalism, then represented by the Eritrean People’s 
Liberation Front (EPLF), although based in the “Semitic-speaking” areas, felt 
the “necessity to create a disciplined nationalist liberation army impervious 
to social, ethnic, regional, tribal, religious and ideological divisions”.68 
66 Personal communication with a former political prisoner, Addis Ababa, 7 September 2012.
67 G. CHALIAND, The Guerilla Struggle, in: B. DAVIDSON (ed.), Behind the War in Eritrea, 
Nottingham 1980, p. 53.
68 D. POOL, From Guerillas to Government. The Eritrean People’s Liberation Front, Oxford 
2001, p. 35.
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Not only these internal aspects could shape the face of nationalism in 
Eritrea, but also external forces usually came into play especially during the 
Cold war. African conflicts were thus largely prolonged and influenced by 
foreign and global dynamics. In Eritrea, EPLF sought to isolate itself from 
these processes and external links, be they through an exile leadership or 
supportive regional states.69
Conclusion
What we can see nowadays is also a part of rediscovering of its “glorious” 
past through publications usually written by foreign observers about Ethiopia, 
the court, daily life, diversity there and so on.70 The same can be said about a 
perpetual reprinting and reexamining of the Adowa victory in 1896 as there 
are plenty of materials written in any form or shape, including version for 
children, which reproduce one of the most important sources of Ethiopian 
nationalism and integrity.71
One of the major problems of the study of nationalism in Ethiopia 
is that it to a certain extent uses the same stereotypes as earlier European 
historiography and anthropology which created the dichotomy between “Us” 
and “Them”. Thus the accent of local and regional histories, instead of ethnic 
histories, is needed in order to understand the complexity and diversity of 
modern and contemporary history of Ethiopia without preconceived notions 
and continuous stereotypes. The effort to accent difference without a proper 
understanding of Ethiopian history in its local, regional, religious and socio-
economic colors can only bring negative results contributing to further 
politicization of history and relations between major groups in the country.72
69 Ibidem, 55–56.
70 See e.g. S. JOHNSON, The History of Rasselas, Prince of Abyssinia, Addis Ababa 2012, 
first published 1759; M. de Salviac, An Ancient People. Great African Nation The Oromo, 
Addis Ababa 2008, first published 1901.
71 See e.g. J. FRANCIS, The Battle of Adwa, Addis Ababa 2002; L. G. DILEBO, The Italo-
Ethiopian War of 1887–1896. From Dogali to Adwa, Addis Ababa 1996.
72 Personal communication with Tesema Ta’a, Addis Ababa, 4 September 2009.
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Politicization of history as well as politicization of ethnicity and ethnic 
histories can also be seen as a part of yet undeveloped political system of 
contemporary Ethiopia lacking any significant signs of civil society which 
allows politicized narratives of any kind to be reproduced without any critical 
understanding or without “ethnic lenses”. As stated by a scholar from the Addis 
Ababa University: “We have adopted the hardware of a political system, but 
have not adopted the software, and that is how it goes from Haile Selassie 
through the Derg until nowadays.”73
Therefore, it is necessary for future generations of Ethiopian and 
Ethiopianist scholars, and generally Africanists to examine and perceive 
history without those lenses that on one hand glorify certain events of the big 
history while ignoring local histories and narratives, and on the other hand 
those lenses that bring into the forefront rather dubious and undeveloped 
issues of controversial local histories putting ethnicity and ethnic narratives 
as the basis for historical as well as contemporary understanding. The debate 
over “colonial” history of Ethiopia can be seen as a part of these issues and 
needs to be examined properly without giving advantage or preference to only 
one of the studied issues, whether it is ethnic, economic, social, religious, or 
political one, and thus to “decolonize” academic debates in regard to modern 
history of Ethiopia.
Abstract
Ethiopia has never been colonized except for a short period of Italian occupation 
in 1930s. It would seem that the absence of European colonialism contributed 
to a rather different development of nationalism due to many different 
historical factors and experiences.  However, since 1950s, and more openly 
from the 1960s we can see the rise of nationalism in Ethiopia which used the 
same “colonial” perspectives as their other African counterparts. When civil 
war broke out in 1962 and Eritrea began to struggle for independence, it had 
a direct impact on other nationalist movements in Ethiopia itself, namely the 
73 Interview, Addis Ababa, 6 September 2012.
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Oromo nationalism. Moreover, in the era of decolonization, Marxism played a 
role of an inspirational revolutionary ideology in many corners of Africa. The 
same can be said about the Oromo nationalism, as it was the main bearer of 
Marxism which then resulted in series of uprising leading to the deposition of 
Haile Sellassie. Suddenly, demands on democratization, self-determination, 
equality, and human rights began to be articulated with the same intensity 
as, for instance, in Rwanda. Later on, demands on “decolonization”, i.e. 
dismantling of “traditional” Imperial régime formed a part of the “social 
revolution”. Haile Sellassie’s regime, once hailed as modernizing, began to 
be seen as backward and in many senses “colonizing” type of rule. It had also 
a direct impact on national identity and/or identities, because the nationalist 
movements redefined centuries long “map” of Ethiopia by giving accent to the 
diverse nature of Ethiopia’s population.
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